Iamblichus: On the Mysteries · 68 of 218 · tr. Thomas Taylor
Chapter XXI
Is, therefore, what you add in the third place more true; viz. “ that there is a certain mixed form of hypostasis, consisting of our soul and divine inspiration externally derived ?” Consider this then more accurately, lest we should be deceived by it, being impeded by its plausibility. For wherever one thing is effected from two, this one thing is wholly of a similar species, nature, and essence. Thus the elements which concur in the same thing, produce one certain thing from many, and many souls coalesce in one total soul. That, however, which is perfectly exempt, can never become one 173 with that which departs from itself; so that neither will there be one certain form of hypostasis 174 with the soul and divine inspiration. For if divinity is unmingled, the soul will not be mingled with it; and if he is immutable, he will not be changed through a concretion into that which is common, from the simplicity of his subsistence. Some, therefore, prior to us, were of opinion that certain small sparks excite in us divine forms. It is impossible, however, that these sparks, whether they are physical, or in some other way corporeal-formed, should be transferred from things of a casual nature to things which are divine. But in what is now asserted by you, the soul is said to be a concause of the divine commixture; and it is evident, this being admitted, that the soul becomes of an equal dignity with the Gods, that it gives a certain part to them and receives a part from them, and that it also affords a measure to natures more excellent than itself, and is itself bounded by them. That likewise follows which is asserted by some, and is most dire, that the Gods precedaneously subsisting in the order of elements, are inherent in their 175 effects, and there will be a certain thing produced in time, and from a mixture according to time, which will contain the Gods in itself. What, likewise, is this comingled form of subsistence? For if it is both [soul and divine inspiration externally derived], it will not be one thing consisting of two, but a certain composite, and a coacervation from two things. But if it is as something different from both, eternal natures will be mutable, and divine natures will in no respect differ from physical substances in generation. And as it is absurd 176 to admit that an eternal nature is produced through generation, it is still more absurd to suppose that any thing which consists of eternal natures can be dissolved. Neither, therefore, is this opinion concerning divination by any means reasonable; and besides this, it is also paradoxical, whether it is considered as one supposition or as two.
A chain of divine beings or principles flowing downward from a single transcendent source (the One or the Father), each level less perfect than the one above.
The text describes Gods precedingentially subsisting in the order of elements before being inherent in their effects.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The passage defines evil or deficiency as a lack of unity and immutability found in the divine nature.
The felt condition of exile from one's divine origin — Rumi's reed flute torn from its bed, Plotinus's 'we have forgotten,' the Gnostic forgetfulness; the affective wound that complements return_to_source and gives the return its motive.
The text states that 'neither will there be one certain form of hypostasis' with the soul and divine inspiration due to their inherent difference.
The doctrine — central to Eastern Orthodox and Maximian theology — that the human person is progressively transformed into a partaker of the divine nature by grace, not merely justified or united in passing ecstasy.
The passage discusses the soul becoming 'of an equal dignity with the Gods' through divine inspiration.