Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names · 19 of 39 · tr. C.E. Rolt
Chapter 4, Section 1s
And if any one says that it is productive, and that by the destruction of one thing it giveth birth to somewhat else, the true answer is that it doth not so qua destructive.
Qua destructive and evil it only destroys and debases; but it taketh upon it the form of birth and essence through the action of the Good.
Thus evil will be found to be a destructive force in itself, but a productive force through the action of the Good.
Qua evil it neither hath being nor confers it; through the action of the Good, it hath being (yea, a good being) and confers being on good things.
Or rather (since we cannot call the same thing both good and bad in the same relations, nor are the destruction and birth of the same thing the same function or faculty, whether productive or destructive, working in the same relations), Evil in itself hath neither being, goodness, productiveness, nor power of creating things which have being 114 and goodness; the Good, on the other hand, wherever It becomes perfectly present, creates perfect, universal and untainted manifestations of goodness; while the things which have a lesser share therein are imperfect manifestations of goodness and mixed with other elements through lack of the Good.
In fine, evil is not in any wise good, nor the maker of good; but every thing must be good only in proportion as it approacheth more or less unto the Good, since the perfect Goodness penetrating all things reacheth not only to the wholly good beings around It, but extendeth even unto the lowest things, being entirely present unto some, and in a lower measure to others, and unto others in lowest measure, according as each one is capable of participating therein.
327 327 D.
is no pantheist.
According to Pantheism God is equally present in all things.
Thus Pantheism is a debased form of the Immanence doctrine, as Calvinism is a debased form of the Transcendence doctrine.
In the one case we get Immanence without Transcendence: in the other Transcendence without Immanence.
D.
holds a Transcendent Immanence (cf.
Bradley, Appearance and Reality, rebutting charge of Pantheism).
Some creatures participate wholly in the Good, others are lacking in It less or more, and others possess a still fainter participation therein, while to others the Good is present as but the faintest echo.
For if the Good were not present only in a manner proportioned unto each, then the divinest and most honourable things would be no higher than the lowest!
And how, pray, could all things have a uniform share in the Good, since not all are equally fit to share entirely therein?
But in truth the exceeding greatness of the power of the Good is shown by this—that It giveth power even to the things which lack It, yea even unto that very lack itself, inasmuch as even here is to be found some kind of participation in It.
328 328 e.
g.
The cruelty of Nature seems to show Intelligence; and Intelligence per se is a good thing.
And, if we must needs 115 boldly speak the truth, even the things that fight against It possess through Its power their being and their capability to fight.
Or rather, to speak shortly, all creatures in so far as they have being are good and come from the Good, and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, neither are good nor have they being.
329 329 All evil things contain the seed of their own decay, and so tend to non-existence.
The arrogance and cruelty of the Germans has been their weakness, as discipline and self-sacrifice has been their strength.
The doctrine that the divine is present within all things and the universe itself, pervading creation rather than remaining solely transcendent above it. Distinct from unity_of_being (the general claim that all existence is one substance, agnostic about whether that substance indwells its parts) and from kingdom_within (the divine present specifically IN THE INDIVIDUAL human, accessible without mediation) — divine_immanence is the general pervading-presence claim applied to all of creation, not a human-specific indwelling.
The passage's central claim is that the Good pervades all things in varying degrees of participation, explicitly rejecting pantheism's uniform presence while affirming that 'the perfect Goodness penetrating all things reacheth not only to the wholly good beings around It, but extendeth even unto the lowest things.'
A chain of divine beings or principles flowing downward from a single transcendent source (the One or the Father), each level less perfect than the one above.
The passage describes a graded hierarchy of participation in the Good, from 'wholly good beings' down to 'the lowest things,' with each level possessing the Good in a lesser measure according to its capacity.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The passage explicitly defines evil as having neither being nor goodness in itself but only through the action of the Good.
The felt condition of exile from one's divine origin — Rumi's reed flute torn from its bed, Plotinus's 'we have forgotten,' the Gnostic forgetfulness; the affective wound that complements return_to_source and gives the return its motive.
The passage contrasts creatures that participate wholly in the Good with those lacking it less or more.