Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names · 18 of 39 · tr. C.E. Rolt
Chapter 4, Section 1r
Now we will bid the questioner look towards the truth of things, and in the first place we will venture thus to answer: “Evil cometh not of the Good; and if it cometh therefrom it is not evil.
For even as fire cannot cool us, so Good cannot produce the things which are not good.
And if all things that have being come from the Good (for it is natural to the Good to produce and preserve the creatures, and natural to evil to corrupt and to destroy them) then nothing in the world cometh of evil.
Then evil can- 112 not even in any wise exist, if it act as evil upon itself.
And unless it do so act, evil is not wholly evil, but hath some portion of the Good whereby it can exist at all.
And if the things that have being desire the Beautiful and Good and accomplish all their acts for the sake of that which seemeth good, and if all that they intend hath the Good as its Motive and its Aim (for nothing looks unto the nature of evil to guide it in its actions), what place is left for evil among things that have being, or how can it have any being at all bereft of such good purpose?
And if all things that have being come of the Good and the Good is Beyond things that have being, then, whereas that which exists not yet hath being in the Good; evil contrariwise hath none (otherwise it were not wholly evil or Non-Ens; for that which is wholly Non-Ens can be but naught except this be spoken Super-Essentially of the Good).
So the Good must have Its seat far above and before that which hath mere being and that which hath not; but evil hath no place either amongst things that have being or things that have not, yea it is farther removed than the Non-Existent from the Good and hath less being than it.
‘Then’ (saith one perchance) ‘whence cometh evil?
For if’ (saith he) ‘evil is not, virtue and vice must needs be the same both in their whole entirety and in their corresponding particulars,’– i.
e.
even that which fighteth against virtue cannot be evil.
And yet temperance is the opposite of debauchery, and righteousness of wickedness.
And I mean not only the righteous and the unrighteous man, or the temperate and intemperate man; I mean that, even before the external distinction appeared between the virtuous man and his opposite, the ultimate distinction between the virtues and the vices hath existed long beforehand in the soul itself, and the passions war against the reason, and hence we must assume something evil 113 which is contrary to goodness.
For goodness is not contrary to itself, but, being come from One Beginning and being the offspring of One Cause, it rejoices in fellowship, unity, and concord.
Even the lesser Good is not contrary to the greater, for that which is less hot or cold is not contrary to that which is more so.
Wherefore evil lieth in the things that have being and possesseth being and is opposed and contrary to goodness.
And if evil is the destruction of things which have being, that depriveth it not of its own being.
It itself still hath being and giveth being to its offspring.
Yea, is not the destruction of one thing often the birth of another?
And thus it will be found that evil maketh contribution unto the fullness of the world, and through its presence, saveth the universe from imperfection.” 20.
The true answer whereunto will be that evil ( qua evil) causes no existence or birth, but only debases and corrupts, so far as its power extends, the substance of things that have being.
Themes
◆Apophatic Theologytheology
Describing the divine only by negation—God transcends all positive categories and concepts; the via negativa.
The text defines evil by negation, stating it cannot exist wholly or act as evil upon itself.
A chain of divine beings or principles flowing downward from a single transcendent source (the One or the Father), each level less perfect than the one above.
The text describes a hierarchy where all things that have being come from the Good and are less perfect than it.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The passage centrally argues that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack or corruption of the Good.