For this is clear, that when we perceived something, either by the help of sight or hearing, or some other sense, there was no difficulty in receiving from this a conception of some other thing like or unlike which had been forgotten and which was associated with this; and therefore, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows: either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is recollection only.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer?
Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we remember afterwards the things which we knew previously to our birth?
I cannot decide at the moment.
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows.
Certainly, he ought.
But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these very matters of which we are speaking?
I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that to-morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason worth having.
Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
Certainly not.
Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned before.
Certainly.
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?-not since we were born as men?
Certainly not.
And therefore previously?
Yes.
Then, Simmias, our souls must have existed before they were in the form of man-without bodies, and must have had intelligence.
Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions were given us at the moment of birth; for this is the only time that remains.
Yes, my friend, but when did we lose them?
for they are not in us when we are born-that is admitted.
Did we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or at some other time?
No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.
Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and essence in general, and to this, which is now discovered to be a previous condition of our being, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them-assuming this to have a prior existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument?
There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the existence of the soul before birth, and of the essence of which you are speaking: and the argument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my own notion.
For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty, goodness, and other notions of which you were just now speaking have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.
Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied?
for I must convince him too.
I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is convinced of the existence of the soul before birth.
But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction.
I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring-the feeling that when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her.
Themes
◆Anamnesissoteriology
Platonic recollection: knowledge as the soul's recovery of what it knew before birth, with learning as remembering rather than acquisition.
The passage explicitly defines learning as recollection rather than acquisition, stating 'learning is recollection only.'
Ontological opposition between two primal principles (light/darkness, truth/lie, spirit/matter) as the fundamental structure of reality.
The distinction between the prior existence of absolute beauty and goodness versus the current state of mortal knowledge implies an ontological opposition.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The argument posits that souls lost their knowledge when they acquired bodies, framing ignorance as a loss rather than a positive creation.
Diotima's staged ascent from love of beautiful bodies → beautiful souls → beautiful pursuits → beautiful knowledge → Beauty itself; the canonical scala amoris that grounds Plotinus's On the Beautiful and Bruno's Eroici Furori — distinct from generic spiritual_ascent in that eros is the specific motive force.
The text describes a progression from knowing beauty to knowing goodness and essence, mirroring the ascent from beautiful bodies to absolute truth.
The felt condition of exile from one's divine origin — Rumi's reed flute torn from its bed, Plotinus's 'we have forgotten,' the Gnostic forgetfulness; the affective wound that complements return_to_source and gives the return its motive.
The passage explicitly describes how souls lost their knowledge at birth and now must recollect what they knew previously before entering mortal existence.