Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names · 21 of 39 · tr. C.E. Rolt
Chapter 4, Section 1u
For things of the same kind cannot 333 333 Exuberant vitality is per se a good thing and the more exuberant the better, though, like all good things, it is dangerous, and unless properly directed is disastrous.
be wholly contradictory to one another in the same respects.
334 334 If good and evil are both existent, they are, to that extent, both of the same kind; which is impossible.
Hence evil is Non-Existent.
21.
Neither inhereth evil in existent creatures.
335 335 So far D.
has been showing that evil is not an ultimate principle, being neither (1) identical with the Good, nor (2j self-subsistent.
Now he argues that it is not a necessary element in any created thing: neither in their existence as such, nor in any particular kind of creature.
For if all creatures are from the Good, and the Good is in them all and embraces them all, either evil can have no place amongst the creatures, or else it must have a place in the Good.
336 336 D.
rambles characteristically, but the general argument is plain.
All existence is from the Good.
Hence, if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good.
Thus D.
meets again and proceeds to lay the ghost of a theory which he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.
Now it cannot inhere in the Good, any more than cold can inhere in fire; just so the quality of becoming evil cannot inhere in that which turns even evil into good.
And if evil doth inhere in the Good, what will the mode of its inherence be?
If you say: It cometh of the Good, I answer: That is absurd and impossible.
For (as the infallible Scriptures say), a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor yet is the converse possible.
But if it cometh not of the Good, it is plainly from another origin and cause.
Either evil must come from the Good, or the Good from evil, or else (if this is impossible} both the Good and evil must be from another origin or cause.
For no duality can be an origin: same unity must be the origin of all duality.
And yet it is absurd to suppose that two entirely 118 opposite things can owe their birth and their being to the same thing.
This would make the origin itself not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contradictory and discordant.
Nor again is it possible that the world should have two contradictory origins, existing in each other and in the whole and mutually at strife.
For, 337 337 Having just given a metaphysical argument for the non-existence of evil, D.
now gives an argument drawn from the actual nature of the universe and of God’s creative activity.
This argument is not so satisfactory as the metaphysical one, for, under all the harmony of the world, there is perpetual strife, and the Cross of Christ reveals God as suffering pain.
“Christ is in an agony and will be till the end of the world” ( Pascal ).
The metaphysical argument is sound because metaphysics deal with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately or ideally non-existent.
The argument from actual facts is unsound because evil is actually existent.
Much wrong thinking on the subject of evil is due to a confusion of ideal with actual non-existence.
D.
here seems to fall into this mistake.
were this assumed, God 338 338 D.
here uses the name “God” because he is thinking of the Absolute or the Good, not in Its ultimate Nature, but in Its emanating or creative activity, in which the Personal Differentiations of the Trinity appear.
See II.
7.
Themes
◆Apophatic Theologytheology
Describing the divine only by negation—God transcends all positive categories and concepts; the via negativa.
The passage argues that evil cannot be an ultimate principle or inherent in existent creatures, negating positive ontological categories.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The passage centrally argues that evil is not an ultimate principle but a non-existent quality that cannot inhere in the Good or existent creatures.