Chapter IX (part 3)

Although we can say the last, the animal cannot, for to its apprehension things are as they appear. It must believe what it sees. How does the world appear to the animal? The world appears to it as a series of complicated moving surfaces. The animal lives in a world of two dimensions . Its universe has for it the properties and appearance of a surface . And upon this surface transpire an enormous number of different movements of a most fantastic character. Why should the world appear to the animal as a surface? First of all, because it appears as a surface to us . But we know that the world is not a surface, and the animal can, not know it. It accepts everything just as it appears. It is powerless p. 102 to correct the testimony of its eyes—or it cannot do so to the extent that we do. We are able to measure in three mutually independent directions: the nature of our mind permits us to do this. The animal can measure simultaneously in two directions only—it can never measure in three directions at once. This is due to the fact that, not possessing concepts, it is unable to retain in the mind the idea of the first two directions, for measuring the third. Let me explain this more exactly. Suppose we imagine that we are measuring the cube . In order to measure the cube in three directions, it is necessary while measuring in one direction, to keep in mind two others— to remember . But it is possible to keep them in mind as concepts only, that is, associating them with different concepts—pasting upon them different labels. So, pasting upon the first two directions the labels of length and breadth , it is possible to measure the height. It is impossible otherwise. As perceptions , the first two measurements of the cube are completely identical, and assuredly will mingle into one in the mind. The animal, without the aid of concepts, cannot paste upon the first two measurements the labels of length and breadth. Therefore, at the moment when it begins to measure the height of the cube, the first two measurements will be confused in one. The animal, attempting to measure the cube by means of perceptions only without the aid of concepts, will be like a cat I once observed. Her kittens—five or six in number—she dragged asunder into different rooms, and could not then collect them together. She seized one, put it beside another, ran for a third and brought it to the first two, but then she seized the first and carried it away to another room, putting it beside the fourth; after that she ran back, seized the second and dragged it to the room containing the fifth, and so on. For a whole hour the cat had no rest with her kittens, she suffered severely, and could accomplish nothing. It is clear that she lacked the concepts which would enable her to remember how many kittens she had altogether. It is in the highest degree important to understand the relation of the animal consciousness to the measuring of bodies. The great point is that the animal sees surfaces only. (We may say this with complete assurance, because we ourselves see surfaces only.) Thus seeing only surfaces the animal can imagine but two p. 103 dimensions. The third-dimension, in contradistinction to the other two, can only be thought ; that is, this dimension must be a concept; but animals do not possess concepts. The third dimension like the others appears as a perception. Therefore, at the moment of its appearance, the first two will inevitably mingle into one. The animal is capable of perceiving the difference between two dimensions: the difference between three it cannot perceive. This difference must be known beforehand, and to know it concepts are necessary. Identical perceptions mix into one for the animal, just as we ourselves confuse two simultaneous, similar phenomena proceeding from the same point.