Section 1a

To Asclepius <This dialogue sets forth the difference between the physical and metaphysical worlds in the context of Greek natural philosophy. Some of the language is fairly technical: the "errant spheres" of sections 6 and 7 are the celestial spheres carrying the planets, while the "inerrant sphere" is that of the fixed stars. It's useful to keep in mind, also, that "air" and "spirit" are interchangeable concepts in Greek thought, and that the concept of the Good has a range of implications which don't come across in the English word: one is that the good of any being, in Greek thought, was also that being's necessary goal. 1. Hermes: All that is moved, Asclepius, is it not moved in something and by something? Asclepius: Assuredly. H: And must not that in which it's moved be greater than the moved? A: It must. H: Mover, again, has greater power than moved? A: It has, of course. H: The nature, furthermore, of that in which it's moved must be quite other from the nature of the moved? A: It must completely. 2. H: Is not, again, this cosmos vast, [so vast] that than it there exists no body greater? A: Assuredly. H: And massive, too, for it is crammed with multitudes of other mighty frames, nay, rather all the other bodies that there are? A: It is. H: And yet the cosmos is a body? A: It is a body. H: And one that's moved? 3. A: Assuredly. H: Of what size, then, must be the space in which it's moved, and of what kind [must be] the nature [of that space]? Must it not be far vaster [than the cosmos], in order that it may be able to find room for its continued course, so that the moved may not be cramped for want of room and lose its motion? A: Something, Thrice-greatest one, it needs must be, immensely vast. 4. H: And of what nature? Must it not be, Asclepius, of just the contrary? And is not contrary to body bodiless? A: Agreed. H: Space, then, is bodiless. But bodiless must either be some godlike thing or God [Himself]. And by "some godlike thing" I mean no more the generable [i.e., that which is generated] but the ingenerable. 5. If, then, space be some godlike thing, it is substantial; but if 'tis God [Himself], it transcends substance. But it is to be thought of otherwise [than God], and in this way. God is first "thinkable" <or "intelligible"> for us, not for Himself, for that the thing that's thought doth fall beneath the thinker's sense. God then cannot be "thinkable" unto Himself, in that He's thought of by Himself as being nothing else but what He thinks. But he is "something else" for us, and so He's thought of by us. 6. If space is, therefore, to be thought, [it should] not, [then, be thought as] God, but space. If God is also to be thought, [He should] not [be conceived] as space, but as energy that can contain [all space]. Further, all that is moved is moved not in the moved but in the stable. And that which moves [another] is of course stationary, for 'tis impossible that it should move with it.