Front Matter, p. 4 (part 6)

34 all things, and yet as separate and apart from all; as the source of all multitude, yet himself perfect unity; and as immensly prolific, yet divinely solitary and ineffably good. Thus, according to Porphyry m , explaining the properties of incorporeal natures, God, intellect, and soul are each of them every where, because .no where. But God is every where, and at the same time, in no place of any being posterior to his nature; but he is only such as he is, and such as he willed himself to be. But intellect is indeed in the Deity, yet every and in no place of its subordinate essences. And soul is in intellect, and in the Deity, every where and no where with respect to body; but body exists in and in intellect, and .in God. And though all beings, and nonentities, proceed from, and subsist in the p. 35 Deity, yet he is neither entities, or nonentities, nor has any subsistence in them. For if he was alone every where, he would indeed be all things, and in all: but because he is likewise no where, all things are produced by him; so that they subsist in him because he is every where, but are different from him because he is no where. Thus also intellect being every where and no where, is the cause of souls, and of natures subordinate to soul: at the same time it is neither soul, nor such things as are posterior to the soul, nor has it any subsistence in them; and this because it is not only every where in its subordinate natures, but at the same time no where. Thus too, soul is neither body, nor in body, but is the cause of body; because while it is every where diffused through body, it is no where. And this procession of the universe, extends as far as to p. 36 that nature n , which is incapable of being at the same time every where and no where, but which partially participates of each, And in another place of the same excellent fragment, he tells us that the ancients explaining the property of an incorporeal nature, as far as this can be effected by discourse, when they affirmed it to be one, at the same time add, that it is likewise all things; that it is every where, and no where, and that it is totally present in every whole. He adds, they express its nature entirely by contrary properties, that they may remove from it the fictitious and delusive conceptions of bodies which obscure those properties by which true being is known o . p. 37 We have before observed, that the Platonic philosophers, agreeable to the doctrine of Orpheus, considered fecundity as, in an eminent degree, the propery of a divine nature; and from this principle filled the universe with Gods p . This opinion a modern philosopher, or a modern writer on mythology, will doubtless consider as too ridiculous to need a serious refutation the one, because he believes the phenomena may be solved by mechanical causes; and the other, in consequence of a system originating from prejudice, and supported without proof. However, prejudice apart, p. 38 let us hear what the philosophers can urge in defence of this doctrine, in addition to what we have already advanced. To begin then with Onatus q the Pythagorean: "Those," says he, "who assert that there is but one God, and not many Gods, are deceived, as not considering that the supreme dignity of the divine transcendency consists in governing beings similar to itself, and in surpassing others. But the other Gods have the same relation to this first and intelligible God, as the dancer, to the Coryphæus, and as soldiers to their general, whose duty is to follow their leader.