Tertium Organum (P.D. Ouspensky) · 60 of 225 · tr. Nicholas Bessaraboff and Claude Bragdon
Chapter VIII (part 6)
We may declare with entire assurance that instinct is a pleasure-pain which, like the positive and negative poles of an electro-magnet, repels and attracts the animal in this or that direction, compelling it to perform whole series of complex actions, sometimes expedient to such a degree that they appear to be sensible, and not only sensible, but founded upon foresight of the future, almost upon some clairvoyance, like the migration of birds, the building of nests for the young which have not as yet appeared, the finding of the way south in the autumn, and north in the spring, etc.
But all these actions are explained in reality by a single instinct, i.e., by the subservience to pleasure-pain .
During periods in which millenniums may be regarded as days, by selection among all animals the types have been perfected, living along the lines of this subservience.
This subservience is expedient, that is, the results of it lead to the desired goal.
Why this is so is clear.
Had the sense of pleasure arisen from that which is detrimental, the given species could not live, and would quickly die out.
Instinct is the guide of its life, but only as long as instinct is expedient solely; just as soon as it ceases to be expedient it becomes the guide of death, and the species soon dies out.
Normally "pleasure-pain" is pleasant or unpleasant not for the usefulness p.
89 or the harm which may result, but because of it.
Those influences which proved to be beneficial for a given species during the vegetative life, with the transition to the more active and complex animal life begin to be sensed as pleasant , the detrimental influences as unpleasant.
As regards two different species, one and the same influence—say a certain temperature—may be useful and pleasant for one, and for another detrimental and unpleasant.
It is clear, therefore, that the subservience to "pleasure-pain" must be governed by expediency.
The pleasant is pleasant because it is beneficial , the unpleasant is unpleasant because it is harmful .
Next after instinctive actions follow those actions which are rational and automatic.
By rational action is meant such an action as is known to the acting subject before its execution ; such an action as the acting subject can name , define , explain , can show its cause and purpose before its execution .
Automatic actions are actions which have been rational for a given subject, but because of frequent repetitions they have become habitual and are performed unconsciously.
The acquired automatic actions of trained animals were previously rational not in the animal, but in the trainer.
Such actions often appear as rational but this is a complete illusion.
The animal remembers the sequence of actions, and therefore its actions appear to be considered and expedient.
They really were considered, but not by it .
Automatic actions are often confounded with instinctive ones—in reality they resemble instinctive ones, but there is an enormous difference between them.
Automatic actions are developed by the subject during its own life, and for a long time before they become automatic it must be conscious of them.
Instinctive actions, on the other hand, are developed during the life-periods of the species , and the aptitude for them is transmitted in a definite manner by heredity.
It is possible to call automatic actions instinctive actions worked out for itself by a given subject.
It is impossible , however, to call instinctive actions automatic actions worked out by a given species, because they never were rational in different individuals of a given species, but were compounded out of a series of complex reflexes.
REFLEXES, INSTINCTIVE AND "RATIONAL" ACTIONS, ALL MAY BE REGARDED AS REFLECTED, i.e., AS NOT SELF-ORIGINATED.
BOTH THESE AND OTHERS, AND STILL A THIRD CLASS, COME NOT FROM MAN p.
Themes
◇Mechanical Humanityanthropology
Gurdjieff and Ouspensky's claim that ordinary human beings live in a state of waking sleep, reacting mechanically without unified will or consciousness, and that the spiritual path begins with recognising this condition.
[auto] The passage explicitly categorizes instinctive, automatic, and rational actions as 'reflected' and 'not self-originated,' describing the mechanical nature of human behavior central to Ouspensky's system.
All passages →Related passages · 4 parallels
◆neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 35 (part 1)
“Section 2 2.
Those that deny the happy life to the plants on the ground that they lack sensation are really denying it to all living things.
By sensation can be meant only perception of state, and the state of well-being must be Good in i…”
Both passages explore the nature of instinct and rational actions, discussing the role of pleasure and pain in guiding behavior and the distinction between instinctive and rational actions. They both delve into the concept of expediency and the underlying principles governing life and well-being.
◆neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 348 (part 2)
“Thus anger has two phases; there is firstly that which, rising apart from all process of reasoning, draws reason to itself by the medium of the imaging faculty, and secondly that which, rising in reason, touches finally upon the specific pr…”
Both passages explore the relationship between instinctive actions, pleasure-pain, and the underlying principles governing behavior. They discuss how these principles guide actions and how they are shaped by expediency and beneficial outcomes, though in different contexts and traditions.
◆neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 350
“Section 30 30. We have declared acts of memory unnecessary to the stars, but we allow them perceptions, hearing as well as seeing; for we said that prayers to them were heard- our supplications to the sun, and those, even, of certain other…”
Both passages explore the relationship between instinct, pleasure-pain, and rational actions, though from different perspectives. Ouspensky discusses instinct as a guide governed by pleasure-pain and its expediency, while Plotinus examines anger and its connection to the vegetal principle of pleasure and pain, highlighting the role of reason and sensation.
◆renaissance_hermeticism|Agrippa: The Philosophy of Natural Magic, Chapter LXII — Of the Passions of the Mind, their Original Source, Differences, and Kinds|Chapter LXII, Section 1
“CHAPTER LXII. Of the Passions of the Mind, their Original Source, Differences, and Kinds . The passions of the human mind are nothing else but certain motions or inclinations proceeding from the apprehension of any thing, as of good or evil…”
Both passages explore the nature of instinctive and rational actions, and the role of pleasure and pain in guiding behavior. They discuss how actions can be categorized based on their origins and the level of consciousness involved, showing a conceptual parallel in their exploration of human and animal behavior.