Chapter I (part 4)

Also, all phenomena not in time, divorced from the idea of time, not taken in this or that fashion from the standpoint of before , now , after , would co-exist for us simultaneously, and all mixed up with one another, and our weak mind would not be able to distinguish one moment in the infinite variety. Therefore our consciousness segregates, out of a chaos of impressions, separate groups, and we construct in space and time the perceptions of things according to these groups of impressions. It is necessary for us to divide things somehow , and we divide them into the categories of space and time. But we should remember that these divisions exist only in us, in our knowledge of things and not in the things themselves; that we do not know the true relations of things among themselves, and the real things we do not know, but only phantoms, visions of things—we do not know the relation existing among the things in reality. At the same time we quite definitely know that our division of things into the categories of space and time does not at all correspond to the division of things in themselves , independently of our receptivity of them; and we quite definitely know that if there exist any division at all among things in themselves , it will in no case be a division in terms of space and time according to our usual understanding of these words, because such a division is not a property of things, but of our knowledge of things gained through the senses. Moreover, we do not know if it is even possible to distinguish those divisions which we see , i.e., in space and time, if things are looked at not through human eyes, not from the human standpoint . In point of fact we do not know but that p. 17 our world would present an entirely different aspect for a differently built organism. We cannot perceive things as images outside of the categories of space and time, but we constantly think of them outside of space and time. When we say that table , we picture the table to ourselves in space and time; but when we say an object made of wood , not meaning any definite thing, but speaking generally, it will relate to all things made of wood throughout the world, and in all ages. An imaginative person could conceive that we are referring to some great thing made of wood, composed of all objects whenever and wherever wooden things existed, these forming its constituent atoms , as it were. We do not comprehend all these matters quite clearly, but in general it is plain that we think in space and time by perceptions only; but by concepts we think independently of space and time. ______ Kant named his views critical idealism , in contradiction to dogmatic idealism , of which Berkeley was a representative. According to dogmatic idealism, all the world, all things—i.e., the true causes of our sensations—do not exist except in our consciousness: they exist only so far as we know them. The entire world perceived by us is just a reflection of ourselves. Kantian idealism recognizes a world of causes outside of us, but asserts that we cannot know the world by means of sensuous perception, and everything that we perceive, generally speaking, is of our own creation— the product of a cognizing being . So, according to Kant, everything that we find in things is put in them by ourselves. Independently of ourselves we do not know what the world is like. And our cognition of things has nothing in common with the things as they are outside of us—that is, in themselves. Furthermore, and most important, our ignorance of things in themselves does not depend upon our insufficient knowledge , but is due to the fact that by means of sensuous perception we cannot know the world correctly at all . That is p. 18 to say, we cannot truly declare that although now we perhaps know little, presently we shall know more, and at length shall come to a correct understanding of the world.