Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names · 27 of 39 · tr. C.E. Rolt
Chapter 4, Section 1aa
127 There remains but one alternative: Evil is a weakness and deficiency of Good.
31.
Good things have all one cause.
If evil is opposed to the Good, then hath evil many causes.
The efficient causes of evil results, however, are not any laws and faculties, but an impotence and weakness and an inharmonious mingling of discordant elements.
Evil things are not immutable and unchanging but indeterminate and indefinite: the sport of alien influences which have no definite aim.
The Good must be the beginning and the end even of all evil things.
For the Good is the final Purpose of all things, good and bad alike.
For even when we act amiss we do so from a longing for the Good; for no one makes evil his definite object when performing any action.
Hence evil hath no substantial being, but only a shadow thereof; since the Good, and not itself, is the ultimate object for which it comes into existence.
32.
Unto evil we can attribute but an accidental kind of existence.
It exists for the sake of something else, and is not self-originating.
And hence our action appears to be right (for it hath Good as its object) while yet it is not really right (because we mistake for good that which is not good).
‘Tis proven, then, that our purpose is different from our action.
Thus evil is contrary to progress, purpose, nature, cause, principle, end, law, will, and being.
Evil is, then, a lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a disproportion, an error, purposeless, unlovely, lifeless, unwise, unreasonable, imperfect, unreal, causeless, indeterminate, sterile, inert, powerless, disordered, incongruous, indefinite, dark, unsubstantial, and never in itself possessed of any existence whatever.
How, 128 then, is it that an admixture of the Good bestows any power upon evil?
For that which is altogether destitute of Good is nothing and hath no power.
And if the Good is Existent and is the Source of will, power, and action, how can Its opposite (being destitute of existence, will, power, and activity), have any power against It?
Only because evil things are not all entirely the same in all cases and in all relations.
359 359 i.
e.
Evil things are not entirety bad, but are bad only in some partial aspect.
In the case of a devil evil lieth in the being contrary to spiritual goodness; in the soul it lieth in the being contrary to reason; in the body it lieth in the being contrary to nature.
33.
How can evil things have any existence at all if there is a Providence?
Only because evil (as such) hath no being, neither inhereth it in things that have being.
And naught that hath being is independent of Providence; for evil hath no being at all, except when mingled with the Good.
And if no thing in the world is without a share in the Good, and evil is the deficiency of Good and no thing in the world is utterly destitute of Good, then the Divine Providence is in all things, and nothing that exists can be without It.
Yea, even the evil effects that arise are turned by Providence to a kindly purpose, for the succour of themselves or others (either individually or in common), and thus it is that Providence cares individually for each particular thing in all the world.
Therefore we shall pay no heed to the fond argument so often heard that “Providence shall lead us unto virtue even against our will.” ‘Tis not worthy of Providence to violate nature.
Pronoia — the doctrine that the divine actively orders the unfolding of the cosmos and human affairs toward intelligible ends, against pure chance or blind necessity.
The passage centrally argues that Providence is active in all things, turning evil effects to a kindly purpose.
Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.
The text explicitly defines Evil as a weakness and deficiency of Good rather than a positive substance.