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Plato: Timaeus · 31 of 50 · tr. Benjamin Jowett

Section 1

And about all of them this has to be considered:-that the tendency of each towards its kindred element makes the body which is moved heavy, and the place towards which the motion tends below, but things which have an opposite tendency we call by an opposite name. Such are the causes which we assign to these phenomena. As to the smooth and the rough, any one who sees them can explain the reason of them to another. For roughness is hardness mingled with irregularity, and smoothness is produced by the joint effect of uniformity and density. The most important of the affections which concern the whole body remains to be considered-that is, the cause of pleasure and pain in the perceptions of which I have been speaking, and in all other things which are perceived by sense through the parts of the body, and have both pains and pleasures attendant on them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remembering that we have already distinguished between the nature which is easy and which is hard to move; for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take. A body which is of a nature to be easily moved, on receiving an impression however slight, spreads abroad the motion in a circle, the parts communicating with each other, until at last, reaching the principle of mind, they announce the quality of the agent. But a body of the opposite kind, being immobile, and not extending to the surrounding region, merely receives the impression, and does not stir any of the neighbouring parts; and since the parts do not distribute the original impression to other parts, it has no effect of motion on the whole animal, and therefore produces no effect on the patient. This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthy parts of the human body; whereas what was said above relates mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the greatest amount of fire and air. Now we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful; and, again, the sudden return to nature is pleasant; but a gentle and gradual return is imperceptible and vice versa. On the other hand the impression of sense which is most easily produced is most readily felt, but is not accompanied by Pleasure or pain; such, for example, are the affections of the sight, which, as we said above, is a body naturally uniting with our body in the day-time; for cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the sight do not give pain, nor is there pleasure when the sight returns to its natural state; but the sensations are dearest and strongest according to the manner in which the eye is affected by the object, and itself strikes and touches it; there is no violence either in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a struggle; and then they impart their motions to the whole and cause pleasure and pain-pain when alienated from their natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. Things which experience gradual withdrawings and emptyings of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to perceive the emptying, but are sensible of the replenishment; and so they occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure, to the mortal part of the soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes. But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradually and with difficulty return to their own nature, have effects in every way opposite to the former, as is evident in the case of burnings and cuttings of the body. Thus have we discussed the general affections of the whole body, and the names of the agents which produce them.
Themes
Cosmic Consciousnessanthropology

A state of awareness transcending ordinary human consciousness, often involving unity with the universe or higher dimensions.

The passage describes a principle of mind that receives impressions from the body and announces the quality of the agent.

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Evil As Privationtheology

Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.

Pain is defined as an impression contrary to nature and violent, aligning with the concept that evil lacks positive being but is a distortion of natural conditions.

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Microcosm Macrocosmcosmology

The human being as a small-scale image of the entire cosmos; the body, soul, and intellect mirroring the structure of the heavens and the divine — distinct from correspondence in that it makes the human the privileged mirror.

The human body is described as a composite of elements that mirror the cosmic nature of fire and air.

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Related passages · 6 parallels
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 5
Section 1 1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat? Clearly, either in the Soul alone, or in the Soul as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving fro…”
Both passages explore the nature of affections and experiences, particularly pleasure and pain, and their relationship to the soul and the body. They both delve into the mechanisms by which these affections are perceived and processed, though from different philosophical and mystical traditions.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 235
Section 3 3. But how do we explain likings and aversions? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear- are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul? This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes t…”
Both passages explore the relationship between the soul/mind and the body, particularly how emotions and sensations are experienced. They both argue that while the soul or mind is the origin of these experiences, the physical manifestations occur in the body. The passages share a conceptual parallel in distinguishing the immaterial nature of the soul/mind from the material body.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 236 (part 1)
Section 4 4. We have, however, still to examine what is called the affective phase of the Soul. This has, no doubt, been touched upon above where we dealt with the passions in general as grouped about the initiative phase of the Soul and…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul's affective phase and the relationship between affections, judgments, and bodily reactions. They discuss how affections originate and affect the soul and body, though from different philosophical and mystical traditions.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 238 (part 2)
It is lifeless objects that deal the severest blows; they hit hardest and hurt most; where there is life- that is to say participation in Being- there is beneficence towards the environment, all the greater as the measure of Being is fuller…”
Both passages explore the nature of being, corporeality, and the effects of bodily affections. They discuss how the degree of being or corporeality influences susceptibility and the nature of affections, showing a genuine conceptual parallel in their exploration of these themes.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 339
Section 19 19. Thus what we know as pleasure and pain may be identified: pain is our perception of a body despoiled, deprived of the image of the soul; pleasure our perception of the living frame in which the image of the soul is brought ba…”
Both passages explore the nature of pleasure and pain, discussing how the soul or mind perceives these sensations through the body. They both describe the mechanisms by which the body and soul interact to produce these experiences, though from different philosophical and mystical traditions.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 340
Section 20 20. As with bodily pain and pleasure so with the bodily desires; their origin, also, must be attributed to what thus stands midway, to that Nature we described as the corporeal. Body undetermined cannot be imagined to give rise t…”
Both passages discuss the nature of pleasure and pain, attributing them to the body's reactions to impressions and the soul's response to these bodily states. They share a conceptual framework that links bodily sensations to the soul's perceptions and actions, though they come from different philosophical traditions.