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Plato: Phaedo · 26 of 44 · tr. Benjamin Jowett

Section 1z

Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony. Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements out of which it is compounded? Certainly not. Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer? He agreed. Then a harmony does not lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them. He assented. For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to the parts. That would be impossible, he replied. And does not every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized? I do not understand you, he said. I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more completely harmonized, if that be possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less harmonized. True. But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another? Not in the least. Yet surely one soul is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another soul is said to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly? Yes, truly. But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?-Will they say that there is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her? I cannot say, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of that kind would be asserted by those who take this view. And the admission is already made that no soul is more a soul than another; and this is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony? Quite true. And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized? True. And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony? Yes, an equal harmony. Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized? Exactly. And therefore has neither more nor less of harmony or of discord? She has not. And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony? Not at all more. Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical? No. And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice? How can she have, consistently with the preceding argument? Then, according to this, if the souls of all animals are equally and absolutely souls, they will be equally good? I agree with you, Socrates, he said. And can all this be true, think you? he said; and are all these consequences admissible-which nevertheless seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony? Certainly not, he said. Once more, he said, what ruling principle is there of human things other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any? Indeed, I do not. And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them?
Themes
Evil As Privationtheology

Augustinian and Plotinian doctrine that evil has no positive being of its own but is a lack, distortion, or absence of the good — denying ontological dualism while preserving moral seriousness.

The passage argues that vice is discord rather than a positive quality inherent in the soul's composition.

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Paradox As Teachingethics

Using apparent contradiction, reversal, or riddle to destabilise ordinary understanding and induce insight.

The dialogue uses apparent contradictions (soul as harmony yet possessing virtue/vice) to destabilize ordinary understanding and induce insight into the nature of the soul.

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Self Knowledgesoteriology

The recognition of one's own true divine nature as the primary path to liberation; 'know thyself' as soteriology.

The dialogue centers on the inquiry into whether one soul is more or less a soul than another, implying a search for the true nature of the self.

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Unity Of Beingtheology

The doctrine that all existence is ultimately one substance or one divine reality; non-duality as a theological claim.

The argument concludes that all souls are equally and absolutely souls, suggesting an underlying ontological unity among human beings.

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Related passages · 7 parallels
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 285 (part 1)
Section 1 1. In our attempt to elucidate the Essence of the soul, we show it to be neither a material fabric nor, among immaterial things, a harmony. The theory that it is some final development, some entelechy, we pass by, holding this t…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul and reject the idea that it is a harmony. They both delve into the characteristics of the soul, with Plotinus emphasizing its intellectual and divine nature, while Socrates uses a dialogue to argue against the soul being a harmony, focusing on the implications of such a view.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 286 (part 1)
Section 2 2. It can be demonstrated that soul must, necessarily, be of just this nature and that there can be no other soul than such a being, one neither wholly partible but both at once. If it had the nature of body it would consist of…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul and its relationship to the body and harmony. They both argue against the soul being a composite or divisible entity, emphasizing its unity and indivisibility.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 289 (part 1)
Section 2 2. To this our first answer is that to place certain things under one identical class- by admitting an identical range of operation- is to make them of one common species, and puts an end to all mention of part; the reasonable co…”
Both passages discuss the nature of the soul and its relationship to particular entities or forms. They explore the idea of the soul as a unified, indivisible entity that cannot be reduced to parts or harmonies, emphasizing the soul's essential unity and its distinction from material or composite entities.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 291
Section 4 4. But if this is the true account of the unity of soul, we must be able to meet the problems that ensue: firstly, the difficulty of one thing being present at the same moment in all things; and, secondly, the difficulty of soul i…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul and its relationship to the body. Plato's Phaedo argues against the soul being a harmony, emphasizing its independence and unity, while Plotinus discusses the unity and differentiation of the soul, particularly in relation to the body and the Intellectual-Principle. Both texts delve into the metaphysical and ontological aspects of the soul, seeking to understand its essence and connection to the physical world.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 295 (part 1)
Section 8 8. These considerations, amounting to the settlement of the question, are not countered by the phenomenon of sympathy; the response between soul and soul is due to the mere fact that all spring from that self-same soul [the next…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul and its relationship to harmony and multiplicity. Plato's passage argues against the soul being a harmony, while Plotinus discusses the unity and multiplicity of souls, but both engage with the concept of the soul's nature and its degrees or forms.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 391
Section 8 8. D. (12) Soul belongs, then, to another Nature: What is this? Is it something which, while distinct from body, still belongs to it, for example a harmony or accord? The Pythagorean school holds this view thinking that the soul i…”
Both passages discuss the nature of the soul and argue against the Pythagorean view that the soul is a harmony or accord. They explore the implications of this view and conclude that the soul is not a harmony.
neoplatonism|Select Works of Plotinus|Select Works, Section 413
Section 4 4. These reflections should show that there is nothing strange in that reduction of all souls to one. But it is still necessary to enquire into the mode and conditions of the unity. Is it the unity of origin in a unity? And if so,…”
Both passages explore the nature of the soul and its unity. Plotinus discusses the unity of souls originating from one source, while Socrates argues against the soul being a harmony, both delving into the essential nature and oneness of the soul.