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Select Works of Plotinus · 268 of 752 · tr. Thomas Taylor

Select Works, Section 261 (part 1)

Section 9 9. "A Number, a Measure, belonging to Movement?" This, at least, is plausible since Movement is a continuous thin; but let us consider. To begin with, we have the doubt which met us when we probed its identification with extent of Movement: is Time the measure of any and every Movement? Have we any means of calculating disconnected and lawless Movement? What number or measure would apply? What would be the principle of such a Measure? One Measure for movement slow and fast, for any and every movement: then that number and measure would be like the decade, by which we reckon horses and cows, or like some common standard for liquids and solids. If Time is this Kind of Measure, we learn, no doubt, of what objects it is a Measure- of Movements- but we are no nearer understanding what it is in itself. Or: we may take the decade and think of it, apart from the horses or cows, as a pure number; this gives us a measure which, even though not actually applied, has a definite nature. Is Time, perhaps, a Measure in this sense? No: to tell us no more of Time in itself than that it is such a number is merely to bring us back to the decade we have already rejected, or to some similar collective figure. If, on the other hand, Time is [not such an abstraction but] a Measure possessing a continuous extent of its own, it must have quantity, like a foot-rule; it must have magnitude: it will, clearly, be in the nature of a line traversing the path of Movement. But, itself thus sharing in the movement, how can it be a Measure of Movement? Why should the one of the two be the measure rather than the other? Besides an accompanying measure is more plausibly considered as a measure of the particular movement it accompanies than of Movement in general. Further, this entire discussion assumes continuous movement, since the accompanying principle; Time, is itself unbroken [but a full explanation implies justification of Time in repose]. The fact is that we are not to think of a measure outside and apart, but of a combined thing, a measured Movement, and we are to discover what measures it. Given a Movement measured, are we to suppose the measure to be a magnitude? If so, which of these two would be Time, the measured movement or the measuring magnitude? For Time [as measure] must be either the movement measured by magnitude, or the measuring magnitude itself or something using the magnitude like a yard-stick to appraise the movement. In all three cases, as we have indicated, the application is scarcely plausible except where continuous movement is assumed: unless the Movement proceeds smoothly, and even unintermittently and as embracing the entire content of the moving object, great difficulties arise in the identification of Time with any kind of measure. Let us, then, suppose Time to be this "measured Movement," measured by quantity. Now the Movement if it is to be measured requires a measure outside itself; this was the only reason for raising the question of the accompanying measure. In exactly the same way the measuring magnitude, in turn, will require a measure, because only when the standard shows such and such an extension can the degree of movement be appraised. Time then will be, not the magnitude accompanying the Movement, but that numerical value by which the magnitude accompanying the Movement is estimated. But that number can be only the abstract figure which represents the magnitude, and it is difficult to see how an abstract figure can perform the act of measuring. And, supposing that we discover a way in which it can, we still have not Time, the measure, but a particular quantity of Time, not at all the same thing: Time means something very different from any definite period: before all question as to quantity is the question as to the thing of which a certain quantity is present.
Related passages · 3 parallels
christian_mysticism|Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names|Chapter 10, Section 1b
For where Scripture speaks of things as “eternal” it doth not always mean things that are absolutely Uncreated or verily Everlasting, Incorruptible, 171 Immortal, Invariable, and Immutable ( e.g. “Be ye lift up, ye eternal doors,” 461 461…”
Both passages explore the nature of time and its relationship to movement and eternity. They both delve into the abstract and philosophical understanding of time, though from different religious and philosophical traditions.
hermeticism|Corpus Hermeticum 2: The Serapeum|Section 1b
A: How is it, then, that things down here, Thrice-greatest one, are moved with those that are [already] moved? For thou hast said the errant spheres were moved by the inerrant one. H: This is not, O Asclepius, a moving with, but one again…”
Both passages explore the nature of movement and its relationship to stability and time. They discuss how movement is not merely a function of the medium in which it occurs but involves deeper, often contradictory forces or principles.
western_esoteric|Tertium Organum (P.D. Ouspensky)|Chapter IV (part 8)
We have that sense, therefore we sense motion. The time-sense is the sensation of changing moments. If we did not have this time-sense we could not feel motion. The "time-sense" is itself, in substance, the limit or the surface of our "s…”
Both passages explore the nature of time and its relationship to motion and space, albeit from different perspectives. Ouspensky discusses the time-sense as an extension of the space-sense and its connection to higher dimensions, while the second passage examines the distinction between movement and time, arguing that time is not identical to movement.