Chapter VIII”

“Let, therefore, this universe be denominated by us all heaven , or the world , or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted to receive,” beautifully thus observes concerning the divine name of the world. “As of statues established by the telestic art, some things pertaining to them are manifest, but others are inwardly concealed, being symbolical of the presence of the Gods, and which are only known to the mystic artists themselves; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligible, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indications of its divinity; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the participation of being received by it from the father, who gave it perfection, in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven , indeed, and the world are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter, so far as it proceeds from the intelligible; but the former, so far as it is converted to it. It is, however, necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and which is a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names adapted to every order of things; those, indeed, that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia being dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion doxastic. This also Plato says in the Cratylus, where he embraces what is asserted by Homer on this subject, who admits that names of the same things are with the Gods different from those that subsist in the opinions of men, Xanthus by God, by men Scamander call’d Iliad xx. v. 74. And, Which the Gods Chalcis, men Cymindis call. Iliad xiv. v. 291. And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names of the one are different from those of the other; since divine names unfold the whole essence of the things named, but those of men only partially come into contact with them. Plato, therefore, knowing that this preexisted in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name itself, which is different from the apparent name, and with the greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, “ or whatever other appellation ” and “ it may receive ” are a latent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and as allotted a divine essence, in order that it may be coordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists; some of which are called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some being significant of the invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Through these causes, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and the apparent and unapparent name of the world are delivered. And the former name, indeed, is dyadic, but the latter monadic. For the words “ whatever other ” are significant of oneness. You may also consider the ineffable name of the universe as significant of its abiding in the father; but the name world , as indicative of its progression; and heaven of its conversion. But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which it is full of good; abiding ineffably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to the good as the antecedent object of desire.” 126 . See the additional notes at the end of vol. v.